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embark on its “Titoist” escapade. The
de-Stalinization theme set by the Twentieth Communist Party Congress of the
Soviet Union in February 1956 made a
major impact on Soviet thinking. Nikita
Khrushchev, Anastas Mikoyan, and
even such hard-liners as Mikhail Suslov
seemed predisposed to allow Budapest a
significant degree of autonomy in its interpretation of communism. Were it
not for the massacre of party officials in
Budapest’s Republic Square, Gati argues, the revolution stood an excellent
chance to succeed.
Perhaps the bigger nemesis was Washington. The combined incompetence of
the Central Intelligence Agency; the misguided, provocative propaganda of the
Radio Free Europe (RFE) team in Munich; and the White House refusal to focus on the plight of Budapest during the
Suez crisis created a “perfect storm”—
encouraging the Hungarian Revolution
without any serious thought of ever supporting it. This would not have been so
painful had not 96 percent of all Hungarians, most of whom ravenously devoured the RFE reports, thought that the
United States would provide unlimited
support for the revolution.
This account certainly warrants reading
by history buffs and public policy makers alike. Gati has a way of personalizing
the day-by-day accounts of the action in
Budapest that makes for an easy read.
However, the reader is left with a series
of provocative questions. What made the
Soviet politburo overturn its decision
and ultimately send in tanks to Hungary? Was Washington capable of focusing on more than one flash point at a
time? Would at least one fluent
Hungarian-speaking CIA agent in Hungary have made a difference in U.S. policy? Fortunately for his readership, Gati
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is not short of hindsight on any of these
questions.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Pearlman, Michael D. Truman and MacArthur:
Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2008.
352pp. $29.95

Michael D. Pearlman retired in 2006 as
professor of history at the Army Command and General Staff College. He
now offers a complete history of the political, diplomatic, and military factors
leading to President Harry S. Truman’s
April 1951 firing of General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander, Far
East. A presentation at times overdone
for general readers, this scholarly work
will interest those who specialize in
American strategic and diplomatic decision making from post–World War II
through the Korean War.
Problems between Truman and his
viceroy in Asia began early in the Korean War. In August 1950 Truman ordered MacArthur to rescind a public
statement sent to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in
which MacArthur advocated preserving
Taiwan for a future attack on mainland
China. This statement was in direct
conflict with White House policy to
keep the war in Korea limited.
Late in December 1950, after the Chinese attacked across the Yalu River in
Korea, MacArthur responded to a Joint
Chiefs of Staff message with a
counterproposal. He advocated these
decisive destructive blows: a blockade
of Chinese coastal areas, destruction of
Chinese industrial capacities to wage

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 23
160

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

war, and Nationalist Chinese forces to
counterattack on the mainland.
Early in 1951, when the Chinese communist forces began to falter in the face
of tougher American and allied resistance, MacArthur became bolder and
attacked the Truman administration’s
concept of limited war in Korea. On 24
March MacArthur preempted the administration by announcing his willingness to negotiate with enemy
commanders.
Truman conferred with his key advisers
and a consensus emerged that MacArthur’s insubordination called for his
dismissal. The occasion, though not the
cause, was a letter from MacArthur to
Joseph Martin, the senior Republican in
the House of Representatives. The letter, which praised a speech of Martin’s
calling for a second front in China, was
read into The Congressional Record on 5
April. Six days later, MacArthur was
fired.
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Pearlman’s credentials are manifest. He
has produced a thorough account of decision making, bureaucratic and partisan politics, and old grudges and
resentments. The latter are sometimes
extraneous, but to his credit, he also examines another aspect of the Korean
conflict—events behind closed doors in
Beijing and Moscow. The work offers
valuable information on Sino-Soviet relations during this period, though the
author might have expanded on this
subject beyond the limited issues of Stalin’s fear of an American nuclear attack
and his sales of arms to Mao Tse-tung.
In sum, this is a first-rate research effort
by a distinguished historian, writing in
a lively style that somewhat counterbalances the book’s density, and of considerable value and interest to students of
the period.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont
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